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The formal roots of Platonism 
Bhupinder Singh Anand 
We present some arguments for the thesis that a set-theoretic inspired faith, in 
the ability of intuitive truth to faithfully reflect relationships between elements 
of a Platonic universe, may be as misplaced as an assumption that such truth 
cannot be expressed in a constructive, and effectively verifiable, manner. 
1.  An implicit thesis, and an explicit belief 
In a 1991 lecture on “The Future of Set Theory”, Saharon Shelah presents an overview of 
classical Set Theory that is based on an implicit thesis - that intuitive truth is essentially 
non-verifiable - and on the explicit belief that: 
... ZFC exhausts our intuition except for things like consistency statements, so a proof 
means a proof in ZFC ... all of us are actually proving theorems in ZFC.1 
It is not obvious whether Shelah makes a precise distinction between such, vision-based, 
intuitive truth, and Tarski’s formal, but essentially non-constructive, classical definitions 
of the truth of formulas of a formal system under a given interpretation2, since he remarks 
that: 
I am in my heart a card-carrying Platonist seeing before my eyes the universe of sets 
... (regarding) the role of foundations, and philosophy ... I do not have any objection 
                                               
1 All quotations attributed to Shelah are from [Sh91]. 
 
2 Cf. Mendelson ([Me64], p49-53). We take Mendelson [Me64] as a representative exposition of the 
foundational concepts of classical mathematics considered in this paper. 
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to those issues per se, but I am suspicious ... My feeling, in an overstated form, is that 
beauty is for eternity, while philosophical value follows fashion. 
1.1  Shelah’s faith may be misplaced 
However, Shelah’s faith, in the ability of intuitive truth to faithfully reflect relationships 
between elements of a Platonic universe, may be as misplaced as his assumption that 
such truth cannot be expressed in a constructive, and effectively verifiable, manner. 
As we show in Anand [An02a], there is a constructive, and intuitionistically 
unobjectionable, proof that the replacement axiom3 of ZFC is inconsistent with an 
interpretation of standard PA in ZFC. Thus the question of intuitive truth may be linked 
to that of the consistent introduction of mathematical concepts into ZFC, through 
axiomatic postulation, in ways that may not be immediately obvious to a self-confessed 
Platonist, such as Shelah, even if we grant him the vision that is implicit in his following 
remarks: 
From the large cardinal point of view: the statements of their existence are semi-
axioms, (for extremists - axioms). Adherents will probably say: looking at how the 
cumulative hierarchy is formed it is silly to stop at stage omega after having all the 
hereditarily finite sets, nor have we stopped with Zermelo set theory, having all 
ordinals up to alephomega, so why should we stop at the first inaccessible, the first 
Mahlo, the first weakly compact, or the first of many measurables? We are continuing 
the search for the true axioms, which have a strong influence on sets below (even on 
reals) and they are plausible, semi-axioms at least. 
                                               
3 We take the replacement (comprehension/separation) axiom (axiom schema) as stating, essentially, that 
the range of every function, whose domain is a well-defined set in an axiomatic set theory Z, and whose 
values are always elements of a well-defined set in Z, is a well-defined set in Z. 
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A very interesting phenomenon, attesting to the naturality of these axioms, is their 
being linearly ordered (i.e., those which arise naturally), though we get them from 
various combinatorial principles many of which imitate aleph0, and from consistency 
of various “small” statements. It seems that all “natural” statements are equiconsistent 
with some large cardinal in this scale; all of this prove their naturality. 
This raises the question: 
ISSUE: Is there some theorem explaining this, or is our vision just more uniform than 
we realize? 
Intuition tells me that the power set and replacement axioms hold, as well as choice 
(except in artificial universes), whereas it does not tell me much on the existence of 
inaccessibles. According to my experience, people sophisticated about mathematics 
with no knowledge of set theory will accept ZFC when it is presented informally (and 
well), including choice but not large cardinals. You can use collections of families of 
sets of functions from the complex field to itself, taking non-emptiness of cartesian 
products for granted and nobody will notice, nor would an omega-fold iteration of the 
operation of forming the power set disturb anybody. So the existence of a large 
cardinal is a very natural statement (and an interesting one) and theorems on large 
cardinals are very interesting as implications, not as theorems (whereas proving you 
can use less than ZFC does not seem to me very interesting). 
Prima facie, Shelah seems to implicitly imply that there is a perceptible difference 
between treating an assertion as an implication (presumably from a non-intuitive set of 
axioms and semi-axioms), and treating it as a theorem (presumably from an intuitive set 
of axioms); however, he also appears to comfortably accept that the dividing line between 
what is non-intuitive, and what is intuitive, may be essentially subjective. 
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Now, from within the framework of a Platonist philosophy, differences in individual 
perceptions of such a dividing line are, perhaps, acceptable as reflecting differences in the 
levels of awareness, between individual perceivers, of the Platonic existence of 
mathematical concepts. However, apart from the ethical questions implicit in the 
acceptance of, firstly, an objective, absolute, truth and, secondly, subjective, gradable, 
levels of awareness4, such differences would be a matter of serious concern for 
disciplines for whom mathematics is, essentially, a language of reliable, and verifiable, 
external expression and communication. Such a language should, clearly, be based on 
notions of formal truth that offer greater precision in, and verifiability of, its assertions 
than that suggested by Shelah’s notion of intuitive truth in his above comments. 
Perhaps the point is better illustrated by observing how practicing scientists actually view 
mathematics. For instance, in the pre-print of his forthcoming book, “What is and what 
will be - Integrating spirituality and science”, Budnik [Bu01] writes: 
(a) If infinity is a potential and never a completed reality then infinite sets do not 
exist.  
(b) The objects definable within a formal mathematical system no matter what axioms 
of infinity it includes are countable (they can be mapped onto the integers). This 
result is called the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. The idea of the proof is that a 
formal system can be interpreted as a computer program for generating theorems. 
Such a program can output all of the names of the objects or sets definable with the 
system. These names and thus the collection of all objects they refer to are countable. 
They can be mapped onto the integers.  
                                               
4 As are implicitly implied by subjective expressions such as “people sophisticated about mathematics”. 
 
 5
(c) All real numbers and for that matter larger cardinals that can ever be defined in 
any mathematical system that finite creatures create will be countable. They will not 
be countable from within the system. Cantor`s proof is correct as a proof about formal 
systems. If real numbers do not exist Cantor's proof is about the structure of formal 
systems and not some greater metaphysical reality.5 
(d) This suggests that the theory of cardinals is an illusion. It is talking indirectly 
about ways of extending mathematics that are countable and reducible to properties of 
computer programs. The set of reals definable within a formal system is a countable 
set in a more powerful formal system. In the more powerful system there is a 
countable ordinal that characterizes this set. Because we are talking about names 
generated by a computer program there is a connection between this countable ordinal 
and properties of computer programs.  
(e) It is easy to talk about a formal system plus an uncountable number of axioms that 
state the existence of all reals. Each real number can be defined as an infinite 
sequence of digits. We cannot write the entire sequence but we have a sense of what 
an arbitrary real is. In this way mathematicians talk about the true set theory that 
includes all reals.  
(f) The human mathematical mind is the product of biological evolution. There is no 
evidence of a special facility that transcends the finite. On the contrary all the 
evidence suggests the opposite. The current ‘theological’ approach to mathematical 
truth flies in the face of the evidence. We believe the cardinality of the real numbers 
is C. We do not think any real number as a completed infinite sequence exists. Of 
                                               
5 Given the present context, it is interesting to assess the meaning of the last two remarks - and the one 
following - in view of the arguments in Anand [An03b]. 
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course the integers and rational numbers are also considered reals so one could argue 
that the cardinality of the reals is aleph0 or the same as omega.  
(g) Mathematics involves the creation of truth which has an objective meaning. This 
is truth about what a computer does if it is allowed to run forever perhaps following 
an ever expanding number of paths. 
(h) Mathematical statements that cannot be interpreted as questions about events all 
of which will occur in a potentially infinite deterministic universe are neither true nor 
false in any absolute sense. Of course, they may be useful properties that are either 
true or false relative to a particular formal system. 
(i) Mathematics gives us some sense of what is possible and establishes some of the 
conditions necessary to realize those possibilities. 
What is interesting about these observations, made - no doubt after considerable 
deliberation - by a theoretical physicist and computer scientist, is that the authority of 
standard interpretations of classical mathematics is seen, and accepted - perhaps with 
some element of reluctance, since such acceptance occasionally flies against the grain of 
observation and experience - not only as absolute, but also as implicitly promising 
sufficiency, when needed, to help bridge the unbridgeable chasm between a Platonic 
world of abstract objects, and the real world of sensory perceptions! 
1.2  Is mathematics the lingua franca of science 
As we remark in Anand [An03d], at the heart of this issue is the widespread notion, 
arguably bordering on misconception, that mathematics is a dispensable tool of science6, 
                                               
6 An extreme statement of this is seen in Wegner and Goldin’s remark that “... computer science is a 
fundamentally non-mathematical discipline” [WG03]. 
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rather than its indispensable mother tongue. If we accept the dictum that what we see 
reflects more what we are than what there is, then this attitude seems to be reflected, 
albeit faintly and obliquely, in Shelah’s following assertion as well: 
... some of the best minds in the field of set theory, feel apologetic about their subject. 
Many are apologetic toward mathematicians, (implying somehow that there are 
mathematicians and there are logicians, as if they are disjoint species) working in 
fields which are surely deeper, harder, more profound and meaningful, etc., and so we 
have to justify our existence by finding applications of “logic” to “mathematics”. ... 
Now, I love to prove theorems in as many areas of mathematics as I can, but I do not 
like this ... attitude ...  
Now, an explicit thesis of this paper, which is part of a set of related papers where we 
attempt to view the consequences of Anand [An02a] from a broader perspective, is that 
such a perception of the nature of mathematics may be less the reflection of any 
mathematical dogma7, and more a reflection, as noted in Anand [An03d], of 
mathematical: 
... ambiguities, in the classical definitions of foundational elements, that allow the 
introduction of non-constructive - hence non-verifiable, non-computational, 
ambiguous, and essentially Platonic - elements into the standard interpretations of 
classical mathematics8.  
Consequently, standard interpretations of classical theory may, inadvertently, be 
weakening a desirable perception - that of mathematics as the lingua franca of 
                                               
7 In other words, although standard interpretations of classical mathematical theory may be responsible for 
tolerating, and perhaps even seeding and sympathetically nurturing, such a perception, they cannot, strictly 
speaking, be held accountable for its promotion. 
 
8 See, for instance, the arguments in Anand [An03b]. 
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scientific expression - by ignoring the possibility that, since mathematics is, indeed, 
indisputably accepted as the language that most effectively expresses and 
communicates intuitive truth, the chasm between intuitive truth and formal truth on 
the one hand, and between formal truth and provability on the other, must, of 
necessity, be bridgeable.9 
1.3  The roots of Platonism lie in the replacement axiom 
That the construction of such a bridge may be a necessity, rather than a matter of 
philosophical choice, is indicated by Meta-lemma 1 of Anand [An02a], and its 
consequences, where we essentially prove the following:  
If we give a precise definition of a mathematical object as any individual constant, 
function letter, or predicate letter that can be introduced into a formal theory without 
inviting inconsistency, then we can constructively prove that there is a primitive 
recursive function, F(x), such that the function letter F is not a mathematical object. 
An immediate consequence of the above is that the range of such an F cannot be 
introduced as a set in any axiomatic set theory, which models standard PA, without 
inviting inconsistency ([An02a], Corollary 1.1). It follows that the replacement axiom of 
ZFC must, then, be inconsistent with the axioms of standard PA when these are 
interpreted in ZFC. 
Prima facie, accepting the consequences of such a constructively derived result should, 
reasonably, lead to constructive re-interpretations not only of the obviously non-
constructive interpretations of classical set theories, but also to a constructive re-
interpretation of the more troublesome classical concepts of Theoretical Computer 
                                               
9 Of interest, in this context, is Davis’s argument [Da95] that an unprovable truth may, indeed, be arrived at 
algorithmically. 
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Science that are not obviously non-constructive; for instance, the concept of a 
constructively defined, but Turing uncomputable, Halting function10. 
More significantly, if Meta-lemma 1 (op cit) implies that we cannot assume that the range 
of every recursive function defines a (recursively enumerable) set in ZFC ([An02a], 
Corollary 1.1), then the essential soundness of a set theory based on the standard 
interpretations of foundational concepts of classical mathematics, where it is implicitly 
assumed that the range of every recursive function is necessarily a recursively 
enumerable set in ZFC, may need to be re-assessed. Meta-lemma 1 highlights the fact - 
which is not obvious, and which does not seem to be explicitly addressed by standard 
interpretations of classical theory - that such an assumption may be axiomatic; it would, 
thus, be incapable of proof, although, like the Church-Turing Thesis, it could be 
vulnerable to disproof in some set theories, as we argue in Anand ([An02a], Corollary 
1.1). 
Now we note that the replacement axiom was originally intended to prevent the logical, 
and mathematical, paradoxes from being introduced into axiomatic set theories. 
However, if the mathematical concepts defined by the antinomies are not mathematical 
objects (which, in fact, is what the paradoxes establish) then the axiom can possibly be 
discarded, using Occam’s dictum, without any loss of generality. 
We also note that, although the replacement axiom may ensure that all the known, non-
constructively defined, paradoxical concepts - such as Russell’s impredicative set - 
cannot be introduced as sets of ZFC, it does not, by itself, guarantee that some unknown, 
constructively defined set, which it may admit as a ZFC set, will not invite inconsistency. 
                                               
10 Cf. Anand [An03d]. 
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Such an assurance is only available by an appeal to the abstractions of a set-theoretic 
intuition that, prima facie, appears qualitatively different11 from the arithmetical intuition 
that is called upon to accept recursive functions and relations, or the standard 
interpretations of the axioms of a basic formal system of Arithmetic such as standard PA. 
However, the arguments of Anand [An02a] imply that our set-theoretic intuition may not 
be as reliable. 
We note, further, that, appearances to the contrary, it is, arguably, the replacement axiom 
that seems to unrestrictedly admit mathematical concepts that are not mathematical 
objects into ZFC, rather than the power set axiom, the axiom of choice, or any axiom 
admitting the existence of a specifically defined infinite set. Thus, it can be reasonably 
argued that the roots of Platonism may essentially lie in the acceptance of a replacement 
axiom; if so, then, over time, such of these roots as are critically dependent on the 
replacement axiom for their sustenance should, therefore, wither away if the axiom is 
excised. 
1.4  Standard PA and individual independence / consistency results 
We note that accepting, firstly, the introduction of constructive definitions of classical 
foundational concepts as below, and, secondly, the arguments of Anand [An02a] - for 
eliminating the replacement axiom - may have some intriguing consequences. 
Firstly, there is the possibility that all formal mathematical systems could be 
constructively built upon standard PA without any loss of generality. 
Secondly, assertions in any set-theoretic model of standard PA would necessarily be 
conditional on the provision of constructive12 independence, or, at the least, consistency, 
                                               
11 Shelah’s remark, “I also have a keen interest in the natural numbers, (though too platonic) but not as a set 
theorist”, also seems to suggest such a qualitative difference. 
 
12 In contrast to the essentially non-constructive nature of classical forcing arguments. 
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results for ensuring that the individual constants, function letters, or predicate letters, 
which occur in such assertions, are, indeed, consistent with the interpretation of the 
axioms of standard PA in the model (and can thus be introduced into standard PA 
through appropriate defining axioms13 without inviting inconsistency). 
1.5  Shelah’s shift to formal proofs of independence 
Thus, Shelah’s shift from the study of set-theoretic proofs towards the development of 
formal independence results using forcing methods may be more significant than is 
apparent from some of his remarks. As we argue in Anand [An02a], not every well-
defined mathematical concept corresponds to a mathematical object. Hence, a proof that a 
concept is consistent with a theory, and can thus be introduced into the theory by suitable 
defining axioms (that need not be independent) without inviting inconsistency, or a proof 
that the concept is independent of the theory, and can, therefore, be added to the theory in 
the form of suitable defining axioms (or their negations) to enlarge the theory without 
inviting inconsistency, may be crucial for legitimising theorems that are conditional on 
the concept being a mathematical object. 
Shelah’s following remarks, regarding his explicit perception of the significance of 
independence results, are also revealing: 
L. Harrington asked me a few years ago: what good does it do you to know all those 
independences? My answer was: to sort out possible theorems - after throwing away 
all relations which do not hold you no longer have a heap of questions which clearly 
are all independent, the trash is thrown away and in what remains you find some 
grains of gold. This is in general a good justification for independence results; a good 
                                                                                                                                            
 
13 Cf. Mendelson ([Me64], p82-84). 
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place where this had worked is cardinal arithmetic - before Cohen and Easton, who 
would have looked at alephomega_1aleph_1? 
That this shift goes against the grain of Shelah’s instinctive inclination towards set-
theoretic methods of proof is reflected in his self-dialogue:  
“Does this mean you are a formalist in spite of earlier indications that you are 
Platonist?” I am in my heart a card-carrying Platonist seeing before my eyes the 
universe of sets, but I cannot discard the independence phenomena. 
2. Non-constructivity in classical theory 
We thus conjecture that there may have been, and perhaps yet may be, an implicit vision, 
beyond the horizons of instinctive intuition, that compelled Shaleh to treat independence 
phenomena as significant; a vision, moreover, which may need to be recognised as a 
possible beacon. Despite his personal views on the relevance of foundational issues to the 
study of set theory, Shelah cannot have been completely unaware that there are, indeed, 
disquieting aspects to the definition of foundational concepts that also cannot be lightly 
discarded, or ignored.  
For instance, in his 1990 article “Second Thoughts About Church’s Thesis and 
Mathematical Proofs”, Mendelson’s14 remarks (italicised parenthetical qualifications 
added) suggest that classical definitions of various foundational elements can be argued 
as being either ambiguous, or non-constructive, or, possibly, both: 
Here is the main conclusion I wish to draw: it is completely unwarranted to say that 
CT (Church’s Thesis) is unprovable just because it states an equivalence between a 
vague, imprecise notion (effectively computable function) and a precise mathematical 
                                               
14 Mendelson [Me90]. 
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notion (partial-recursive function). ... The concepts and assumptions that support the 
notion of partial-recursive function are, in an essential way, no less vague and 
imprecise (non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than the notion of 
effectively computable function; the former are just more familiar and are part of a 
respectable theory with connections to other parts of logic and mathematics. (The 
notion of effectively computable function could have been incorporated into an 
axiomatic presentation of classical mathematics, but the acceptance of CT made this 
unnecessary.) ... Functions are defined in terms of sets, but the concept of set is no 
clearer (not more non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than that of 
function and a foundation of mathematics can be based on a theory using function as 
primitive notion instead of set. Tarski’s definition of truth is formulated in set-
theoretic terms, but the notion of set is no clearer (not more non-constructive, and 
intuitionistically objectionable), than that of truth. The model-theoretic definition of 
logical validity is based ultimately on set theory, the foundations of which are no 
clearer (not more non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than our 
intuitive (non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) understanding of 
logical validity. ... The notion of Turing-computable function is no clearer (not more 
non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than, nor more mathematically 
useful (foundationally speaking) than, the notion of an effectively computable 
function. 
2.1  Constructive definitions 
In Anand [An02a], we argue that accepting such leeway in the standard interpretations of 
classical concepts leads to various ambiguities and anomalies that may, however, be 
avoidable if we define foundational concepts - such as the following - constructively in 
terms of a smaller number of primitive, formally undefined but intuitively 
unobjectionable, mathematical concepts: 
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(i) Primitive mathematical object: A primitive mathematical object is any symbol 
for an individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter, which is defined as a 
primitive symbol of a formal mathematical language.15 
(ii) Formal mathematical object: A formal mathematical object is any symbol for an 
individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter that is either a primitive 
mathematical object, or that can be introduced through definition into a formal 
mathematical language without inviting inconsistency.16 
(iii) Mathematical object: A mathematical object is any symbol that is either a 
primitive mathematical object, or a formal mathematical object. 
(iv) Set: A set is the range of any function whose function letter is a mathematical 
object. 
(v) Individual computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is individually 
computable if, and only if, given any natural number k, there is an individually 
effective method (which may depend on the value k) to compute F(k). 
(vi) Uniform computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is uniformly 
computable if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method (necessarily 
independent of x)  such that, given any natural number k, it can compute F(k). 
(vii) Effective computability: A number-theoretic function is effectively computable 
if, and only if, it is either individually computable, or it is uniformly computable.17 
                                               
15 We note that, as remarked by Mendelson [Me90], the terms “function” and “function letter” - and, 
presumably, “individual constant”, “predicate”, and “predicate letter” - can be taken as undefined, primitive 
foundational concepts. 
 
16 We highlight the significance of this definition in Meta-lemma 1 in Anand [An02a]. 
 
17 We note that classical definitions of the effective computability of a function (cf. [Me64], p207) do not 
distinguish between the two cases. The standard interpretation of effective computability is to implicitly 
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(viii) Individual truth: A string [F(x)]18 of a formal system P is individually true 
under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, given any value k in M, there is an 
individually effective method (which may depend on the value k) to determine that 
the interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M.19 
(ix) Uniform truth: A string [F(x)] of a formal system P is uniformly true under an 
interpretation M of P if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method (necessarily 
independent of x) such that, given any value k in M, it can determine that the 
interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M. 
(x) Effective truth: A string [F(x)] of a formal system P is effectively true under an 
interpretation M of P if, and only if, it is either individually true in M, or it is 
uniformly true in M.20 
(xi) Individual Church Thesis: If, for a given relation R(x), and any element k in 
some interpretation M of a formal system P, there is an individually effective method 
such that it will determine whether R(k) holds in M or not, then every element of the 
domain D of M is the interpretation of some term of P, and there is some P-formula 
[R'(x)] such that: 
                                                                                                                                            
treat it as equivalent to the assertion: A number-theoretic function F(x)] of a formal system P is effectively 
computable if, and only if, it is both individually computable, and uniformly computable. 
 
18 We use square brackets to distinguish between the uninterpreted string [F] of a formal system, and the 
symbolic expression “F” that corresponds to it under a given interpretation that unambiguously assigns 
formal, or intuitive, meanings to each individual symbol of the expression “F”. 
 
19 In Anand [An02a], we argue that, under a constructive interpretation of formal Peano Arithmetic, 
Gödel’s undecidable proposition, is individually, but not uniformly, true under the standard interpretation. 
See also Anand [An03c]. 
 
20 We note that, classically, Tarski’s definition of the truth of a formal proposition under an interpretation 
(cf. [Me64], p49-52) does not distinguish between the two cases. The implicitly accepted (standard) 
interpretation of the definition appears, prima facie, to be the non-constructive assertion: A string [F(x)] of 
a formal system P is true under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, it is both uniformly true in M, and 
individually true in M. 
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R(k) holds in M if, and only if, [R'(k)] is P-provable. 
(In other words, the Individual Church Thesis postulates that, if a relation R is 
effectively decidable individually (possibly non-algorithmically) in an interpretation 
M of some formal system P, then R is expressible in P, and its domain necessarily 
consists of only mathematical objects, even if the predicate letter R is not, itself, a 
mathematical object.) 
(xii) Uniform Church Thesis: If, in some interpretation M of a formal system P, 
there is a uniformly effective method such that, for a given relation R(x), and any 
element k in M, it will determine whether R(k) holds in M or not, then R(x) is the 
interpretation in M of a P-formula [R(x)], and: 
   R(k) holds in M if, and only if, [R(k)] is P-provable. 
(Thus, the Uniform Church Thesis postulates that, if a relation R is effectively 
decidable uniformly (necessarily algorithmically) in an interpretation M of a formal 
system P, then, firstly, R is expressible in P, and, secondly, the predicate letter R, and 
all the elements in the domain of the relation R, are necessarily mathematical objects.) 
2.2  Some consequences 
The significance of constructively interpreting foundational concepts and assertions of 
classical mathematics is that: 
(i) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that a formula [R] is P-provable if, and only 
if, [R] is uniformly true in some interpretation M of P. 
(ii) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that if a number-theoretic relation R(x) is 
uniformly satisfied in some interpretation M of P, then the predicate letter “R” is a 
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formal mathematical object in P (i.e. it can be introduced through definition into P 
without inviting inconsistency). 
(iii) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that, if a P-formula [R] is uniformly true in 
some interpretation M of P, then [R] is uniformly true in every model of P. 
(iv) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that if a formula [R] is not P-provable, but 
[R] is classically true under the standard interpretation, then [R] is individually true, 
but not uniformly true, in the standard model of P. 
(v) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that Gödel’s undecidable sentence GUS is 
individually true, but not uniformly true, in the standard model of P.21 
By defining effective computability, both individually and uniformly, along similar lines, 
we can give a constructive definition of uncomputable number-theoretic functions: 
(vi) A number-theoretic function F(x1, ..., xn) in the standard interpretation M of P is 
uncomputable if, and only if, it is effectively computable individually, but not 
effectively computable uniformly. 
This, last, removes the mysticism behind the fact that we can define a number-theoretic 
Halting function that is, paradoxically, Turing-uncomputable. 
(vii) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then every partial recursive number-
theoretic function F(x1, ..., xn) has a unique constructive extension as a total function. 
(viii) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then not every effectively computable 
function is classically Turing computable (so Turing’s Thesis does not, then, hold). 
                                               
21 An intriguing consequence of this argument is considered in Appendix 1 of Anand [An03c]. 
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(ix) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then not every (partially) recursive 
function is classically Turing-computable.22 
(x) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then the class P of polynomial-time 
languages in the P versus NP problem may not define a formal mathematical object. 
3. Generality and the Entscheidungsproblem 
An intriguing aspect of Shelah’s lecture is his revealing remark, reproduced below, that, 
despite his shift towards the development of individual independence results, his 
ideological preference is yet for general methods of proof. 
Now, Hibert’s Entscheidungsproblem can, arguably, be seen as heralding a paradigm 
shift towards an accelerated focusing on the study of general methods of proof - the 
traditional prerogative of pure mathematicians - at the possible expense of a reduced 
attention to the development of specific solutions for individual cases. The latter are, 
prima facie, the primary concern of the applied sciences, which rely on mathematics to 
supply a suitably verifiable language for expressing the results of their specific 
observations, albeit in a coherent and broadly predictable form 
Ironically, the negative answer to the Entscheidungsproblem, which emerged out of the 
work of Church, Turing and Goedel, can, again arguably, be seen as having been 
perceived as a challenge by pure mathematics to concentrate even more on staking out, 
and fortressing, those areas where general expressions can be meaningfully asserted. An 
arguable consequence of such a siege mentality: the interpretation of concepts in terms 
                                               
22 The classical proof that every (partially) recursive function is classically Turing-computable uses 
induction over (partial) recursive functions, thus assuming that every such function is a mathematical 
object; by Meta-lemma 1, such an assumption is invalid. 
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that appear, momentarily, to have an essentially non-existent relatability, in some cases23, 
to the original concerns that prompted the consideration of such ideas in the first place. 
That a bias towards the consideration of general methods may be instinctive, in some 
cases, is suggested by Shelah’s remarks: 
I was attracted first to mathematics and subsequently to mathematical logic by their 
generality, anticipating that this is the normal attitude; it seems I was mistaken. I have 
always felt that examples usually just confuse you (though not always), having 
always specific properties that are traps as they do not hold in general. Note that by 
“generality” I mean I prefer, e.g., to look more at general complete first order theories 
(possibly uncountable) rather than at simple groups of finite Morley rank. 
However I do not believe in “never look at the points, always look at the arrows”; 
each problem has to be dealt with according to its peculiarities, and finding 
applications of your own field in another means showing something that interests the 
others; but given a problem, why not try for the best, most general statement available 
(of course, if the theorem exists, and the additional generality requires no substance, it 
is not exciting). 
Awareness of an instinctive preference for general methods is also seen in Shelah’s 
response to being “accused” of: 
 ... (explaining) in detail why proofs in ZFC are best, and why I prefer them to 
independence results, just two years before launching full scale into forcing.  
where he notes that: 
                                               
23 E.g. the admittedly non-intuitive notion of “inaccessible” cardinals; at least until such time that they can 
be made “accessibl” in some sense by a constructive definition of the notion. 
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I still feel an outright answer in ZFC is best, even though a new technique for proving 
independence may be more interesting. Cohen’s theorem seems to me more 
interesting than a proof of CH, as it supplies us with a general method. 
3.1  Has this bias adversely affected the development of mathematics? 
Now, it can be argued that such a bias, towards an overwhelming development of general 
methods of proof, may be seriously inhibiting the development of mathematics as a 
universal language, which can effectively express all forms of human cognition. 
Increasingly, the major challenges of Theoretical Computer Science, Quantum Physics, 
and other disciplines are, prima facie, to express what appear to be non-algorithmic, but 
determinate, processes; such processes seem to characterise natural laws more than 
classical algorithmic processes. However, the implicit thesis of standard interpretations of 
classical theory - reflected in the broad acceptance of CT - that such phenomena are 
essentially inaccessible to effective methods of expression seems, prima facie, to go 
against the growing body of experimental evidence to the contrary24. 
As we remark in Anand [An03c]: 
... the central issue in the development of AI is that of finding effective methods of 
duplicating the cognitive and expressive processes of the human mind. This issue is 
being increasingly brought into sharper focus by the rapid advances in the 
experimental, behavioral, and computer sciences25. Penrose’s “The Emperor’s New 
Mind”, and “Shadows of the Mind”, highlight what is striking about the attempts, and 
struggles, of current work in these areas to express their observations adequately -
                                               
24 In his 2003 BBC Reith lectures, Ramachandran speculates that it may be possible, at some future date, to 
map, and physically link, the cognitive parts of one brain into another, so the latter can mirror the former’s 
sensory perceptions as identically sensed experiences. 
 
25 See, for instance, footnote 18 in Ramachandran.[RH01]. 
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necessarily in a predictable way - within the standard interpretations of formal 
propositions as offered by classical theory. 
So, the question arises: Are formal classical theories essentially unable to adequately 
express the extent and range of human cognition, or does the problem lie in the way 
formal theories are classically interpreted at the moment? The former addresses the 
question of whether there are absolute limits on our capacity to express human 
cognition unambiguously; the latter, whether there are only temporal limits - not 
necessarily absolute - to the capacity of classical interpretations to communicate 
unambiguously that which we intended to capture within our formal expression. 
The thesis of this, and related, papers26 is that we may comfortably reject the former by 
recognising, firstly, that we can, indeed, constructively define foundational concepts 
unambiguously as indicated above, and, secondly, that, appearances to the contrary, all 
set-theoretic concepts should be capable of constructive interpretations without any loss 
of generality. 
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